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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-2322 
___________ 
 
XING QIANG ZHUO, 
             Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A095-162-432) 
Immigration Judge:  Frederic G. Leeds 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 17, 2012 
Before:  SCIRICA, JORDAN and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
 
. 
(Filed: October 22, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
___________ 
 
PER 
 Xing Qiang Zhuo petitions for review of an order of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) order of 
removal.  We will deny the petition for review. 
CURIAM 
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 The proceedings in this matter originated in 2002, in New York, and have not 
followed a straightforward course.  Because the parties are familiar with the background, 
we present a summary.  Zhuo is a native and citizen of China who entered the United 
States in 2000 without inspection or parole.  The Immigration and Naturalization Service, 
now the Department of Homeland Security, charged him with removability for being an 
alien present without having been admitted or paroled after inspection by an immigration 
officer.  Zhuo conceded his removability but applied for asylum and withholding of 
removal, claiming that his wife had been forcibly sterilized after the birth of their second 
son, and that he had to pay a fine of 3,000 RMB.  After a hearing, the IJ found Zhuo not 
credible, denied Zhuo’s applications, and ordered his removal to China.  In 2003, the BIA 
agreed with the adverse credibility determination and dismissed Zhuo’s appeal. 
 Zhuo filed a motion to reopen, supported in part by his wife’s affidavit.  The BIA 
granted the motion and remanded the matter to the IJ.  On remand, Zhuo again applied 
for asylum, withholding of removal, and also requested relief under the Convention 
Against Torture (“CAT”).  In 2004, the IJ again found Zhuo not credible and denied 
relief on his claims.  In 2006, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s decision and dismissed Zhuo’s 
appeal.  In 2007, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit granted Zhuo’s petition for 
review, concluding that the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was flawed, and that 
Zhuo’s testimony was sufficient to allege an asylum claim on the basis that his wife was 
involuntarily sterilized by government officials.  The Second Circuit remanded the matter 
to the agency. 
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 In 2008, on remand, Zhuo sought and received a change of venue of the agency 
proceedings to Newark, New Jersey.  Under prior BIA precedent, a husband who 
established that his wife underwent a forced abortion or involuntary sterilization was per 
se entitled to refugee status.  See Matter of C-Y-Z-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 915 (BIA 1997).  
However, the Attorney General overruled that precedent in  of J-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 520 
(A.G. 2008), concluding that the spouses of those who have undergone forced abortion or 
involuntary sterilization are not per se entitled to asylum under INA § 101(a)(42), 
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).1
 The IJ held a hearing on December 7, 2009.  Zhuo testified that he left China for 
reasons of economic persecution following the involuntary sterilization of his wife in 
1992.  He stated that officials imposed a fine of 3,000 RMB, but they did not confiscate 
any property or withhold benefits.  At that time, Zhuo was earning 600 RMB per month 
as a carpenter (7,200 RMB per year), while incurring 640 RMB in monthly expenses, so 
he borrowed money from his brothers to make ends meet.  To pay the fine, he borrowed 
from villagers 3,000 RMB, with monthly interest of three percent.  Zhuo stated that in 
1994, the villagers came to his house asking for the money, and they threatened to kill 
him if he did not pay back the loan, but he and his family did not experience any 
problems with the villagers after that.  Eventually, Zhuo left for the United States in 
2000.  After he departed, the Chinese government did not contact his wife, and their 
  Acknowledging the change in law, Zhuo argued on remand that 
he was persecuted for “other resistance” to China’s coercive population control laws. 
                                              
1 We independently reached the same conclusion in Lin-Zheng v. Attorney General, 
557 F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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children remained registered in the household registry.  Zhuo did not have enough money 
to repay the villagers until after he came to the United States, but he stated that the debt 
has been paid. 
 After considering the testimony and other evidence in the record, the IJ denied 
relief and ordered Zhuo’s removal.  The IJ found that the 3,000 RMB fine did not 
constitute persecution, and that Zhuo did not demonstrate a fear of future persecution.  
Thus, the IJ concluded that Zhuo was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal.  
Further, the IJ denied the CAT claim because Zhuo did not present evidence that he is 
more likely than not to be tortured if removed to China.  On April 13, 2012, the BIA 
dismissed Zhuo’s appeal.  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s determinations that Zhuo did not 
establish eligibility for asylum based on past economic persecution and did not show a 
well-founded fear of future persecution, and accordingly, Zhuo also did not meet the 
higher burden of proof required for withholding of removal.  The BIA also noted that the 
claim of death threats made by the villagers to hasten the repayment of the loan was 
insufficient to show persecution, because the record evidence does not show a nexus 
between the private lenders and the government, and because persecution must be 
committed by the government or individuals that the government is unwilling or unable 
to control.  Further, the BIA rejected Zhuo’s claim based on psychological harm that he 
suffered following his wife’s sterilization because he submitted no medical evidence to 
support the claim.  Moreover, the BIA stated that the IJ properly determined that Zhuo 
did not satisfy the requirements for obtaining relief under the CAT. 
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 This petition for review followed.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252.  The BIA agreed with the IJ’s decision and added its own reasoning, and thus, we 
review the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.  See Sandie v. Att’y Gen., 562 F.3d 246, 
250 (3d Cir. 2009).  We review the agency’s factual determinations under the substantial 
evidence standard.  See id. at 251.  The agency’s findings are considered conclusive 
unless “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  We exercise de novo review over the agency’s legal decisions.  
See Sandie
 Although our decision in 
, 455 F.3d at 251. 
Lin-Zheng forecloses Zhuo’s claim of per se asylum 
eligibility based on his wife’s involuntary sterilization, he may establish a basis for 
asylum if he shows that he suffered past persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution 
in China for “other resistance” to the Chinese government’s coercive population control 
program.  See Lin-Zheng, 557 F.3d at 157.  Persecution includes “threats to life, 
confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to 
life or freedom.”  Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993).  However, it “does not 
encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust or even unlawful or 
unconstitutional.”  
 We have considered the record and conclude that it does not compel a finding that 
Zhuo suffered past persecution, or has a well-founded fear of future persecution, on 
account of his “other resistance” to China’s coercive population control policies.  
Although “the deliberate imposition of severe economic disadvantage which threatens a 
petitioner’s life or freedom may constitute persecution,” 
Id. 
Li v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 
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400 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2005), Zhuo did not show that the 3,000 RMB fine rose to that 
level.  As the BIA noted, and as is shown in the record, Zhuo paid the fine by borrowing 
money from villagers unaffiliated with the Chinese government.  In time, he was able to 
repay his debt to those private lenders, with interest, while living in the United States.  
Zhuo did not allege that the Chinese government deprived him of his liberty, food, 
housing, employment, or other life essentials. 2
 In the statement of facts section of his brief, Zhuo states that he also seeks asylum 
based on other examples of “other resistance,” namely, by hiding his wife’s pregnancy, 
by planning and arranging funds for his escape, and by coming to the United States and 
applying for asylum.  Petitioner’s Brief at 3.  We lack jurisdiction to consider these 
claims because he did not raise them as independent grounds for asylum during the 
agency proceedings.  
 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 
447 (3d Cir. 2005).  We add that Zhuo does not present any argument concerning his 
claim of psychological harm from his wife’s forced sterilization, and we will not consider 
that claim any further.  See Bradley v. Att’y Gen.
 As for the incident in which Zhuo alleged that his life was threatened concerning 
the loan repayment, we agree with the BIA that the evidence does not reflect that the 
threat was issued by the government, or that the villagers who threatened Zhuo are 
somehow connected with the government or are individuals that the government is 
, 603 F.3d 235, 243 n.8 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(holding that argument not raised in opening brief is waived). 
                                              
2 Zhuo states in his brief that he would have been denied a number of government 
benefits if the fine remained unpaid.  Because Zhuo did pay the fine, we need not 
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unwilling or unable to control.  See Garcia v. Att’y Gen.
 Because Zhuo did not demonstrate eligibility for asylum, we agree with the BIA 
that he was unable to meet the higher standard applicable to applications for withholding 
of removal.  
, 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 
2011).  On this point, Zhuo refers us to the psychological report in the record indicating 
that he is “borderline in intellectual functioning.”  (A.R. 000245.)  In light of that 
evidence, Zhuo contends that he could not have been expected to provide “detailed or 
coherent testimony, where the government does not ask questions to [elicit] such 
responses.”  Petitioner’s Brief at 4.  We interpret his assertions as an argument that his 
failure to establish a nexus between the private lenders and the Chinese government 
should not be held against him.  We are not persuaded by this argument.  Zhuo does not 
contend that such nexus actually exists.  Regardless, Zhuo was represented by counsel in 
the agency proceedings, and counsel could have presented that information for the record 
by eliciting Zhuo’s testimony, or by other means. 
See Wong v. Att’y Gen., 539 F.3d 225, 236-37 (3d Cir. 2008).  Zhuo does 
not present any argument concerning his CAT claim, and thus, he has waived any 
challenge to the denial of protection under the CAT.  See Bradley
 For the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review. 
, 603 F.3d at 243 n.8. 
                                                                                                                                                  
consider whether the hypothetical denial of benefits would constitute persecution.  
